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1 Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the international indicator of aid worldwide. It
is  managed by the Development  Assistance Committee (DAC)  of  the Organisation for
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD).  The  European  Recovery  Program
(known as the Marshall Plan) funded by the United-States and which provided capital and
technical  expertise  to  boost  European  economies  after  World  War  II  influenced  the
setting up of the DAC in 1961, marking a new approach to cooperation in policy-making.1
2 In 1969, the concept of Official Development Assistance was adopted and since 1972, it has
been defined as
“Flows to developing countries  and multilateral  institutions provided by official
agencies,  including state and local  governments,  or by their  executive agencies,
each transaction of which meets the following test: (1) It is administered with the
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its
main objective and (2) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element
of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent).”2
3 The indicator used to evaluate donor country aid participation is the ratio ODA: Gross
National Income (GNI). In 1970, the United Nations adopted the target of a ratio for ODA
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to GNI of 0.7 and donor countries were invited to reach this target during the decade.
Only 4 countries have done so.3 In 2000, the UN issued the United Nations Millennium
Declaration where it pledged to fulfil a series of targets by 2015. These targets are known
as the 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDG). One of them is a pledge to develop a
global partnership for development and donor countries renewed their pledge to reach
the 0.7 target by 2015. In 2004, the UK government vowed to reach this target by 2013.4
4 In the present article, the terms aid, development aid or ODA are used to refer to the
same concept. Countries sometimes use their own indicators to measure aid spent. For
instance,  the  UK  also  uses  an  indicator  called  the  Gross  Public  Expenditure  on
Development (GPEX). This indicator is different form ODA, namely because it is calculated
for the financial year whereas ODA is calculated by calendar year.5 Since ODA is the main
international measure of aid spent and is also applied by all donor countries, we use it
here to make comparisons between the UK and other DAC countries.
5 In practice, aid can be made up of material, human, financial or other types of resources.6
It can either be directly transferred from the donor country to the recipient country –
bilateral  aid -  or through appointed organizations which pool resources from several
donor countries and allocate them to countries or projects – multilateral aid. As stated in
the definition of ODA, soft loans for development projects where the rate of interest is
below market rates and for which the repayment does not cover the full initial capital can
also be reported as ODA,  as do equity investments if  they are carried out by official
agencies for development purposes. 
6 For aid to be ODA-compliant, it has to flow from a donor country to a recipient country,
both of which feature on DAC official lists. There are currently 29 donor countries and 146
recipient countries and territories.7 In practice, part of the amount declared as ODA never
actually  reaches  recipient  countries.8 Indeed,  ODA  is  a  measure  centred  on  donor
countries.  Unbundling  aid  reveals  that  projects and  campaigns  to  boost  support  for
overseas development, global citizenship lessons in donor country schools, cancellation
or rescheduling of debts and administrative expenditures linked to the management of
ODA are  all  reported ODA.  The  OECD average  of  aid  which definitely  never  reached
recipient countries was roughly 20% for 2011 whereas that proportion for the UK stood at
8.6%.9
7 The paper will address the issue of how British ODA has fared in recent years and it will
try to understand the trends that can be observed. The first part presents statistical data
concerning ODA in the UK and the rest of the world, highlighting the characteristics of
British ODA. Indisputably, the performance of the UK as a donor country stands out and
the next part attempts to account for the resilience of British ODA since the 2008 financial
crisis. The concluding remarks put forward some propositions to explain the long-term
drivers of Britain’s commitment to aid.
 
Development Assistance in times of crisis and
recession: the UK stands out
International trends 
8 Aid is only one of the several types of international flows that reach developing countries
and it accounts for an extremely small share. In 2011, ODA represented 7.1 % of all flows
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into developing countries.10 Other flows include remittances, Foreign Direct investment,
Loans,  Military expenditure and development cooperation not governed by DAC rule.
Overall,  ODA has  been one of  the types  of  flows least  impacted by the 2008 crisis.11
However, it has nonetheless been vulnerable to world crises,12 although the effects were
not always felt immediately. After a period of steady increase from 2000 to 2010 (+63%13),
world ODA dropped by 2% in 2011 and further fell by 4% in 201214 (Figure 1). This reflects
the  impact  of  the  2008-2009  financial  crisis  which  plunged  developed  nations  into
recession,  therefore  reducing the amount  of  resource  flows from donor  countries  to
recipient countries in 2011 and 2012. But the decline was temporary and ODA picked up
again. Data for 2013 shows an increase of 6.1% on 2012 figures and 2013 and 2014 amounts
are equal.15
 
Figure 1 – World ODA 2000-2014 (2014 price and exchange rates) 
Source: OECD Statistics [Online] <http://www2.compareyourcountry.org/oda?
cr=20001&cr1=oecd&lg=en&page=1#> [16th June 2015]
9 The UK is one of the few countries to have actually achieved the target of ratio ODA: GNI
of 0.7. It did so for the first time in 2013. The DAC average ratio is roughly 0.3. The other
countries to have ever reached the 0.7 target are Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden
and  the  Netherlands.  For  the  period  2008  to  2014,  the  ODA:  GNI  ratio  for  the  UK
progressively increased while the aforementioned countries maintained their aid budgets
above 0.7 of their GNI, amidst fluctuations, with the exception of the Netherlands which
slipped below the mark in 2013 and 2014.
10 The UK stands out not only because it is one of the few countries to dedicate 0.7 of its GNI
to its aid budget but also because it is the only major donor in terms of volume of ODA to
do so. The UK is the second largest donor, behind the United States but amongst the five
largest donors, it is the only one to have fulfilled its pledge in terms of ODA to GNI ratio.
With the exception of France for which the ratio ODA: GNI has progressively declined
since 2010, the US, Germany and Japan, which are the other largest donors by volume,
have globally maintained a stable ODA to GNI ratio since 2008.
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The UK’s ODA
11 The ratio ODA: GNI for the UK almost doubled in barely 6 years, from 0.36 in 2007 to 0.71
in 2013 (Figure 2). For the latter year, the top five recipients of British bilateral aid were
Pakistan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India and Nigeria. Amongst these, only Ethiopia has never
been a British colony. In 2013, 7 out of the 20 largest recipients of British ODA were
former colonies. The UK does not officially favour former colonies as aid recipients,16
which statistics for 2011 tend to confirm. Indeed, 33% of British bilateral aid went to 37
countries on the DAC list, which are also members of the Commonwealth.17 The 3 main
sectors that received British aid in 2011 were Health, Education and Governance, totalling
45%  of  the  total  volume  of  aid.  ODA  accounted  for  20%  (US$13.8  billion)  of  the
international flows leaving the country in 2011.18
 
Figure 2 - ODA from the UK 1970-2014 (2014 prices and exchange rates)
Source: OECE Statistics [Online] <http://www2.compareyourcountry.org/oda?
cr=20001&cr1=oecd&lg=en&page=1#> [16th June 2015]
12 Achieving such an increase in aid at a time where many countries, including the UK, are
facing  budget  constraints  raises  the  question  of  how  this  was  achieved.  We  asked
ourselves if in the process of increasing the volume of ODA, the UK had also reviewed how
it was allocated. We used data for the period 2000-2014, since the marked upwards trend
of ODA started around the turn of the century. Overall, amidst fluctuations, the share of
ODA channelled through multilateral organisations has slowly been gaining over that of
bilateral ODA.19 The significance of this is ambiguous since there is no consensus on the
relative superiority of one channel of aid over the other in terms of efficiency.20 
13 Furthermore, within bilateral British ODA, we have grouped spending into three broad
categories, to see if the composition of UK aid was shifting from more grants to more
loans and equities and from more transferred aid to higher proportions of reported aid
not leaving the country. Table 1 below summarizes our findings:
 
Table 1: Average composition of UK bilateral ODA 2000-201421
 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014
Grants likely to be transferred to recipients 59.6% 64.0% 60,01%
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ODA  not  transferred  (Administrative  costs  and  debt
relief) 
13% 17,58% 6,6%22
Loans and equity 4.6% 1.95% 3,25%
Source: DfID STATISTICS [Online], <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-
international-development/about/statistics>, [2nd June 2016]; OECD, Development Co-operation Peer
Reviews: United Kingdom 2006, (Paris, 2006), p. 79; OECD, Development Co-operation Peer Reviews:
United Kingdom 2010, (Paris, 2010), p. 98; OECD, Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: United
Kingdom 2014, (Paris, 2014), p. 103.
14 Overall,  Table  1  shows  that  the  increase  in  ODA  did  not  fundamentally  alter  its
composition. Such a low share of bilateral loans and equity for the period 2010-2014 is
somewhat unexpected, since the coalition government had indicated that these modes of
ODA were preferred over grants as they did not have an impact on the public debt.
However,  it  is  possible that  some loans and equity ODA are also channelled through
multilateral  organisations.23 Further  analysis  of  how  the  different  multilateral
organisations receiving British ODA allocate it would be required to get a fuller picture.
Without being entirely conclusive evidence, the progressive increase of multilateral ODA
and the guidelines spelt out by the Treasury would seem to indicate that the composition
of British ODA has probably evolved towards a greater share of non-grant ODA while
increasing in absolute amount.
15 Not only was the volume of British aid not abated by the crisis, but on the contrary, the
amount increased significantly to enable the UK to respect its commitment of allocating
0.7% of its GNI to ODA. How can we account for this resilience of ODA in an environment
of otherwise shrinking public funding? What explains that other large donors have not
yet  followed in its  footsteps? The answer lies  in part  in the creation in 1997 of  the
Ministry  responsible  for  managing  British  aid,  the  Department  for  International
Development (DfID), which marked both a new commitment of the British government to
development objectives and a foreign policy where aid plays a role in repositioning the
UK as an important global actor.
 
Accounting for the resilience of British ODA since
2008
A changing international context
16 The election of Labour, led by Tony Blair, in 1997 signals a new change in British aid
policy. Part of this change can be attributed to a different way of viewing aid but part of it
is also the result of a different context. Worldwide, the attitude and role of rich countries
in  international  development  was  changing.  The  Brandt  Report,  published  in  1980
recommended increasing the aid budgets, focusing on the poorest countries and resorting
to multilateral institutions to administer aid. Whereas the 1980s and the 1990s had been
characterised by a period where aid was increasingly tied to a country’s  commercial
interests, a consensus progressively seemed to emerge about the need to de-link aid from
export  concerns  but  instead,  inscribe  it  in  a  broader  strategy  to  reduce  poverty.  In
addition,  amidst  the context  of  the Cold War,  aid had been administered along with
security issues and strategic decisions of which countries to support. By 1997, the context
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had changed and New Labour was able to put forward that their foreign policy would be
guided by ethical concerns.24
17 Figure 3 shows that towards the second half of the 1990s, British ODA to GNI ratio begins
to  pick  up,  after  slowly  declining  since  the  end  of  the  1970s.  It  also  highlights  the
distinctive upwards trend of British aid when compared to the average for other donor
countries from the mid-1990s onwards.
 
Figure 3 – ODA: GNI ratio UK and DAC average
Source: OECE Statistics [Online] <http://www2.compareyourcountry.org/oda?
cr=20001&cr1=oecd&lg=en&page=1#> [12th May 2015]
 
A political will 
18 The orientation and development of the DfID is arguable closely linked to Tony Blair’s
approach to  Foreign policy.  He  believed that  the  UK should  engage  in  international
interventionism.25 According  to  his  doctrine  on  international  community  presented
during a speech in Chicago in 1999, nations were increasingly interdependent and there
was  no  separation  between  national  interest  and  international  collaboration.  This
interdependence implied that foreign policy and domestic policy were often intertwined.
He believed interventionism to be a moral imperative in cases where massive numbers of
civilians suffered.26 
19 The  Department  for  International  Development  (DfID)  was  created  in  1997  as  a
distinctive, independent government department and whose Minister was a prominent
member of the Cabinet.  Prior ministries had almost always been subordinated to the
Foreign Office.27 The Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, was
the driving force behind the department during Blair’s first term.28 The DfID placed the
focus on development, not solely aid. As a result, aid was viewed as a means, not an end.
Aid was meant to help create the right conditions within which countries could develop.
Labour built a specific approach to deal with this new department. It published a White
paper  in  1997,  the  first  in  22  years  and  then  another  one  in  2000.  It  issued  public
statements on the government’s  approach and provided explanation to communicate
about its actions to the British public and international stakeholders. It acknowledged
that economic growth and liberalization were essential in the context of globalisation so
emphasis was put on helping poor countries benefit from globalisation, rather than resist
it.29 In  2002,  Parliament  passed  the  International  Development  Act,  whereby  the  UK
committed itself by law to reject the use of aid to serve British commercial interests. In
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keeping  with  its  official  position  that  aid  should  first  and  foremost  maximize
development, under Labour, the DfID favoured grants over loans and equity financing, on
average more than other donor countries.30 
 
2010 and onwards, new governments but a will to maintain high
levels of aid
20 The target of reaching the 0.7 ratio of ODI: GNI was for a long time, a purely rhetorical
aim. However, in 2004, the then UK Secretary of State for International Development,
Hilary Benn and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown actually indicated 2013
as their set year and budgeted for this increase.31 Despite the fact that the New Labour
government in office in 1997 was replaced by a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition
government in 2010, meeting this target remained a priority and in order to do so, the
budget was increased in such a way that from 2012 to 2013, the ratio ODI: GNI jumped
from 0.56 to 0.71.32
21 The coalition government increased emphasis  on the DfID’s  commitment to promote
stability  and  end  extreme  poverty,  namely  through  boosting  economic  growth  and
creating jobs in developing countries, while honouring the pledge of achieving the MDG.33
With  a  view  to  fostering  stability,  the  government  outlined  a  strategy  named  the
“Building Stability Overseas Strategy” in 2011 where it committed itself to allocating 30%
of UK ODA to “fragile and conflict-affected states” and to increase the amount given to
pooled resources.34 The focus on economic development has led the department to recruit
more private  sector  specialists  and be  even more mindful  of  processes  that  actually
produces results. 
22 While still not resorting to non-grant forms of ODA to a significant extent, the current
Conservative government, elected in 2015, intends to increase the use of loans and equity,
35 all the while reporting low amount of non-transferred aid such as student costs, refugee
costs and debt relief as ODA.
 
Conclusion: The long-term drivers of the UK’s
commitment to development assistance
Prestige and international influence and reputation
23 Since  1997,  under  Tony  Blair,  the  UK has  strived  to  play  an  important  role  on  the
forefront  of  the  international  scene.  He  endeavoured  to  rekindle  the  special  bond
between the USA and the UK and to foster links with the EU as well.36 The DfID played a
role in this strategy. It expressed a willingness to work in collaboration with other donors
and organization such as the World Bank, which also partly explains that it enjoys a high
international reputation in the field of aid.37 An independent review by the Centre for
Global Development and the Brookings Institution38 produced a positive assessment of the
quality of UK’s aid in 2014 in their third report on the Quality of ODA. Amongst the major
donor in terms of volume of ODA, the UK definitely stands out, ranking in the top third on
three of the four dimensions of aid quality, namely for maximizing efficiency, fostering
institutions and reducing burden.39 As a former colonial power keeping close links with
its former Empire through the Commonwealth, the British government has expressed its
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belief  that  it  has  a  major  role  to  play  in  improving  the  lives  of  millions  of  people
throughout the world. Several official documents have reasserted this, amongst which a
DfID report on “UK aid: Changing lives, delivering results” from 2011 which mentions the
wish to “Re-emphasize the importance of the Commonwealth.”40 
 
Foreign policy strategy
24 Empirical research on donor motivation highlights that providing aid is a component of
foreign  policy  which  serves  a  purpose  not  solely  humanitarian.  It  can  strengthen
strategic,  economic  or  ideological  components  of  that  foreign  policy.41 Figure  3
highlighted that British ODA followed a trend which set it apart from the DAC average. In
addition, it is the only major donor (in terms of amount of ODA) to have reached the 0.7
target.  It  is  intriguing  that  the  UK is,  in  a  way,  in  a  group of  its  own.  A  thorough
examination of why this is so would require a full comparative analysis, to understand
the motivations of all the donor countries of the DAC and to understand what pushed the
UK to take such a lead. While the scope of such an analysis is beyond what we can achieve
in this article, understanding that aid is part of a wider foreign policy strategy sheds light
on what distinguishes the UK from other donors.42 Internationally, Britain’s dwindling
position as a world superpower throughout the 20th century had left it with considerably
less  influence than it  had previously enjoyed.  Domestically,  amidst  fluctuations,  ODA
generally decreased during Margaret Thatcher’s premiership from 1979 to 1990 and the
ratio ODA: GNI which stood at 0.51 at the beginning of her term had fallen to 0.27 eleven
years later. Tony Blair’s belief in international interventionism implied restoring Britain’s
importance as a world power. In this light, a change of attitude towards aid was one of
the components which would serve Britain’s strategic international interests43 and which
could also set it apart from the previous Conservative governments. The good reputation
the  DfID garnered,  a  repositioning  of  Britain  on the  international  scene  as  a  bridge
between the European Union and the United States44 and Britain’s  several  publicized
commitments to aid45 ensured that the same course was kept when the Conservative-led
coalition replaced Labour in 2010. The coalition government even enshrined its pledge to
meet the 0.7 target by law.46 In a way, although part of Labour’s strategy to restore the
image  of  the  party  and  positioning  the  country  as  an  important  player  on  the
international scene, such endeavours benefitted ODA durably as proven by the coalition
government spectacular effort to meet the 0.7 target in 2013. 
25 In comparison, the United States, which provides the largest amount of ODA, already
enjoys a position of hegemony internationally. Indeed, it is the largest economy in terms
of GDP and a leader in world diplomatic relations. Research has shown that American aid
has tended to defend an ideological stance in favour of democratic regimes and to defend
military  strategic  interests.  Indeed,  owing  to  its  world  power  status  and  large
investments in several countries, it is keen to protect its numerous and valuable interests.
47 As such, the motivation to provide aid and the pattern of US aid is different from that of
the UK. In the case of France, a former major colonial power like the UK and one of the
largest ODA contributors, we may wonder why it has not yet achieved the 0.7 ratio. Like
all western countries, it was affected by the 2007 financial crisis but unlike the UK, aid is
one of the areas where funding was reduced48. The government has also pointed out that
it is using alternative ways to provide aid, such as through a tax on financial transactions,
49 but  these  do  not  appear  as  ODA.  Furthermore,  research  highlights  the  highly
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francophone bias of French aid.50 Since 2014, the Secretary of State for Development is
also responsible for” la Francophonie”, a concept which refers to the link between France
and most of its former colonies, which is based on historical, cultural and diplomatic ties.
51 In 2013 and 2014, three of the top five recipients of French bilateral aid have substantial
French-speaking populations (Morocco, Senegal and Cameroon).52 In addition, out of the
sixteen countries identified as priority recipients of French bilateral aid, only two do not
have French as official language.53 Although both France and the UK seem to view aid as a
means to maintain or extend their sphere of influence, France is however more focused
on its former empire and in this, does not display the same ambition as the UK. 
 
Adapting to a new reality since 2001: security issues
26 Although committed to its objectives since its creation, the DfID has sometimes had to
adapt to a changing international context. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, it was
faced with the responsibility of allocating aid, without breaching its own rules of being
guided only by the objective of  fostering development.  Aid money could not flow to
countries or project solely with the aim of tackling security threats to the UK and fighting
against terrorism. The main beneficiaries of aid had to be the people living in the country
where aid would flow. However, it was possible for the DfID to argue that an insecure
environment  was  not  compatible  with  the  fight  against  poverty  since  it  favoured
terrorism, violence and conflicts which would only worsen the plight of local populations.
54 While the main aim of aid from DfID still remained tackling poverty, tackling security
threats  at  the  same time was  compatible  with  the  Department  objectives  because  it
helped foster the right environment to eradicate poverty. Help to reconstruct Iraq after
2003 was also seemingly not a priority on the DfID agenda because Iraq ranked as a
middle-income country and the DfID had committed itself  to a rule where 90% of its
bilateral help had to be channeled to low-income countries. To give funds to Iraq without
breaking its commitment, the DfID accelerated its withdrawal plans from a selection of
middle-income countries and reduced its spending in others.55 It would appear that some
decisions are taken not solely on the basis of the need to eradicate poverty. The case of
aid to Syria is telling since in 2010, as part of its reorganization, the DfID established a list
of 28 priority countries. Syria was not one of them but the need to deal with Syria as a
conflict-ridden country has made the UK decide to allocate aid to it nonetheless. To do so,
it has reviewed some of its prioritised countries to make room for Syria.56
27 This has prompted some observers57 to comment that the renewed commitment of the
British government to aid in the early 2000s was a way for the country to restore its
tarnished image following its  involvement  in  Iraq.  Placing the  focus  on the  positive
international contributions of the UK is thus a way to improve its reputation.58
 
Migration issues
28 In the eyes of the British government, eradicating poverty is not only a moral duty but it
is also a way to tackle other issues such as that of migration. A White Paper entitled
“Active Diplomacy for a Changing World; The UK’s International Priorities” published in
2006  lists  managing  migration  and combating  illegal  immigration  as  one  of  its  nine
Strategic  Priorities.  Securing  the  long-term  economic  development  of  the  poorest
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countries in the world is arguably also a way of limiting the flow of migrants wishing to
enter the UK.
29 While there is no doubt that the aid budget has not suffered from the crisis and the
ensuing recession,  the reasons explaining this fact are more difficult  to identify.  The
aforementioned  reasons  highlight  the  tension  that  seems  to  exist  behind  the  UK’s
commitment to aid. This tension is adequately illustrated by the title of a book published
in  1991,  “Britain’s  overseas  aid  since  1979:  Between  idealism  and  self-interest.”59 
Although governed by moral principles and poverty alleviation considerations to some
extent, British aid has also been characterized by the need to make sure meeting these
principles also served other interests. This does not necessarily imply a selfish vision,
where  the  sole  beneficiary  of  British  aid  is  the  UK  but  it  does  mean  that  rules,
commitments  and  policy  orientations  have  been  adapted  to  make  sure  that  all  the
objectives, whether selfless or more strategic, were met. Another way of saying this is
that although there is a humanitarian side to the DfID’s work, it is not the actual main
aim of the department. Its objective is to address the cause of poverty and not simply of
alleviating  poverty.60 This  implies  that  obtaining  long-term,  sustainable  economic
growth, working towards conflict resolution, improving governance, fighting corruption
and investing in research and development is also on the agenda of the DfID.61 Providing
aid  is  also  a  way  of  reasserting  the  UK’s  belief  that  it  has  a  role  to  play  on  the
international scene as a prominent country. As such, it seems unlikely that aid from the
UK will decrease dramatically, given the repeated public commitment of the previous
coalition government to reach,  then maintain the 0.7  ratio and the fact  that  Justine
Greening, the current Secretary of State for International Department in the Conservative
government, has been in place since 2012 when the coalition was still in power. However,
the shrinking budget is also a reality, so rather than the volume of ODA, it is the type of
aid that is likely to evolve, with an increase in concessional aid and a decrease in grants, a
trend which may already have started.
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ABSTRACTS
In the wake of the financial  crisis,  which started in the United States in 2007 and given the
problems that developed countries had to face internally, Official Development Assistance (ODA)
was expected to be negatively affected. However, in 2010, net ODA was actually 63% above its
2000 level. So we can wonder if development aid has proven to be one of the few areas which
resisted the onslaught of  the crisis.  The paper will  focus on the case of  British assistance in
recent times. It is indeed both interesting and relevant to pay special attention to the British
example due to its colonial history; Britain has always stood out when it came to development
aid and has displayed a much more extended vision of aid than what is strictly required by the
United Nations (UN) or World Bank standards. British ODA has actually steadily increased since
2007. So far, the United Kingdom (UK) has clearly shown a solid attachment to development and
is amongst the few advanced economies that fulfil the target of allocating 0.7 percent of their
Gross  National  Income  to  ODA.  Given  the  motivations  of  the  British  government  in  its
commitment to aid,  it  is  argued that  Britain is  likely to continue its  good performance as  a
provider of ODA.
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Dans  le  sillage  de  la  crise  financière  qui  débuta  aux Etats-Unis  en  2007  et  compte  tenu des
problèmes qui affectent les pays développés, on aurait pu s’attendre à un recul de l’aide publique
au développement (APD). Cependant, en 2010 l’APD avait augmenté de 63% par rapport à l’an
2000. On peut se demander si l’aide au développement est l’une des rares sphères à avoir échappé
aux conséquences  de  la  crise.  L’article  s’intéresse  plus  particulièrement  à  l’aide  publique  au
développement  britannique  ces  dernières  années.  A  cet  égard,  le  Royaume-Uni  est  un  sujet
d’étude à la fois intéressant et pertinent car en tant qu’ancienne puissance coloniale, il ne s’est
pas  contenté  de  respecter  les  directives  de  l’Organisation  des  Nations-Unies  (ONU)  ou  de  la
Banque mondiale en matière de développement. Il s’est toujours démarqué par sa conception
plus étendue de la  notion d’aide.  Depuis 2007,  l’APD britannique n’a cessé d’augmenter et  la
volonté des autorités d’y consacrer 0,7% du revenu national brut témoigne de leur engagement
durable  envers  le  développement.  A  la  lumière  des  raisons  qui  motivent  les  autorités
britanniques à respecter cet engagement, il semble probable que le gouvernement maintiendra le
cap en tant que contributeur modèle à l’aide publique au développement. 
INDEX
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